Myanmar military will retain “veto” on constitutional reform

Another big stumble for the purported transition to democracy in Burma under the military’s “transitional” leadership.

“Myanmar parliament votes to keep military veto” – BBC News:

MPs in Myanmar vote to keep the army veto over constitutional change, in a blow to Aung San Suu Kyi and hopes for fuller democracy.

 
This isn’t terribly surprising. I don’t think there was ever any particularly compelling (legitimate) reason for the military to remain in charge during the “transition” to democratic rule. Myanmar was already a failed state, so there wasn’t much downside or risk to making a rapid handoff to independent and technocratic civilians to finish the changeover.

Unless, of course, you were the military and never planned to give up power in the first place because “reforms” were onlya smokescreen meant to end global isolation.

Tanzania, like US, lets anyone run to not become president

The 2016 Republican Presidential field here in the United States is indeed filled with a dozen people who will never be elected president, will never be close to being elected president, and could never be president. But it’s easier than ever to run for several months, get a lot of attention, and get a media and publishing deal out of it.

That classic American spirit might be one of the few American concepts currently still being exported overseas. In this case to Tanzania.

Aiming to preserve single-party rule there, Tanzania’s ruling party and state media have suddenly (and very probably only temporarily) elevated an unknown farmer to rockstar status because he filed to run in their 30 candidate presidential primary against far more experienced and affluent candidates, including more than one former prime minister.

Eldoforce Bilohe is a 43-year-old farmer with a primary class seven level of education, who wants to be the next president of Tanzania.

Supporters of the CCM will argue that the fact that an ordinary party member of humble means is able to vie for the party presidential nomination is evidence of true and inclusive democracy within the party.

 
Meanwhile, the Tanzanian opposition may be nearing its first real chance of victory as it unites under one umbrella. Stay tuned!

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6 out of 5 dentists agree: Ethiopia is in no way totalitarian

According to the US State Department (full story➚), Ethiopia’s “democracy” improves with each election.

That must be why the ruling party in this year’s election took 546 out of 546 seats in parliament, significantly improving over last election’s 544 out of 546. Those extra two votes in the chamber should make it easier to buy more state surveillance tools to monitor the population.

Let freedom ring!

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How to break away

Six steps and conditions commonly shared by successful breakaway nation-states, as summarized from a new article in The Economist:

1. Assemble critical mass in a geographically compact/defined area.

2. Maintain a legitimate, ongoing claim to the area. Keep the separate culture alive to preserve legitimacy.

3. Take every opportunity to draw a border, even before independence or autonomy, and stick to it. This creates precedent.

4. Suffering is righteous. That which does not kill you makes you stronger. If you’re destroyed, that’s it. But if you hang on through violent oppression, you have an even better claim and motivation to achieve independence.

5. Use your diaspora. That one is tried and true. If your people are scattered by violence, leverage them (and their likely higher earning potential in places like the U.S.) to raise sympathy, funds, and foreign support for independence. They will be more hardline and inflexible than the people back home, which can be useful.

6. Wait for the super-state to begin breaking up before trying to exit the sub-state.

The armed drones free-for-all at the CIA

Buried in a December 2014 New York Times article was this passage that has been knocking around in my head ever since:

During the presidential campaign in 2008, Mr. Obama railed against the [Central Intelligence A]gency’s use of torture and secret prisons during the Bush administration, and shuttered the detention program during his first week in office. But he has empowered the agency in other ways — including allowing its director, not the White House, to make the final decisions about drone strikes in Pakistan.

 
In other words, an agency that has actively resisted Congressional oversight attempts (to the point of hacking Senate computers) now doesn’t even have Executive oversight — or oversight by any elected civilian — when blowing people away with missiles. The CIA drones program has the power the make literal life and death decisions day in and day out with nobody externally keeping track of it or authorizing individual strikes.

Worse, these strikes aren’t even targeting high-profile people most of the time. Or even any-profile people. The use of so-called “signature strikes” — where they bomb a physical or moving target that has the visual “signature” of something that might be terrorists — by the CIA has become commonplace. These strikes aren’t based on any actual intelligence suggesting someone worth targeting is there. The target just “fits a profile.” That’s how innocent wedding parties get bombed instead of terrorist convoys.

A recent op-ed in The Guardian looked at the general lawlessness and lack of rules surrounding the paramilitary use of drones by the CIA:

After the “rules” were announced in 2013, the Associated Press reported that the US was going to stop signature strikes everywhere, including in Pakistan. Then we found out, through the Wall Street Journal, that actually, no, the president issued a secret waiver for Pakistan and part of the rules didn’t apply there. Now just this week, we’ve learned from the Washington Post that Obama, at some point, issued another waiver on the “imminent” rule for Yemen, allowing the CIA to continue signature strikes there unabated. According to their report: “US officials insisted that there was never a comprehensive ban on the use of signature strikes in that country” to begin with.

In other words, a key part of the drone “rules” Obama laid out in public don’t apply in the two countries where the CIA conducts virtually all of its drone strikes. Oh, and the “imminent threat” rule doesn’t apply in Afghanistan either, the only other country where the US military is regularly conducting its strikes.

 
We should probably keep foreign intelligence collection and analysis in one agency and keep military activities in the military. Unaccountable paramilitaries are never a good development for any country — particularly not a democracy.

MQ-1 Predator unmanned aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo/Lt Col Leslie Pratt via Wikimedia)

MQ-1 Predator unmanned aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo/Lt Col Leslie Pratt via Wikimedia)

ISIS preps Palmyra classical ruins for demolition

Following the collapse of a short-lived defense by the Syrian Army, the ancient city of Palmyra fell into the hands of ISIS.

The latest: “Islamic State group plants mines and bombs in Palmyra, says monitoring body” – France 24

Of course ISIS wants to blow up Palmyra. It’s the symbol of a very brief empire that started in central Syria, rapidly expanded across the Middle East with little resistance from existing regional powers, was crushingly destroyed 3 years later by Western armies of Rome, and has since been virtually forgotten by the world. What does that sound a lot like? ISIS, in a few years. Sadly, Syria (and the world) will have lost another UNESCO World Heritage site in the meantime…

Palmyra, 2009 pre-war view from Qalaat Ibn Maan, Temple of Bel and colonnaded axis. (Photo Credit: Arian Zwegers via Wikimedia)

Palmyra, 2009 pre-war view from Qalaat Ibn Maan, Temple of Bel and colonnaded axis. (Photo Credit: Arian Zwegers via Wikimedia)

US weapons flood risks destabilizing Iraqi Kurdistan

A new report in Foreign Affairs argues that the uncontrolled flood of weapons from U.S. government sources to Iraqi Kurdish officers in the field and official weapons grants routed through Baghdad (all for the purpose of fighting ISIS quickly, of course) is undermining years of careful work to professionalize the Kurdish peshmerga forces and bring them under civilian authority and a unified military chain of command regardless of Kurdish political parties. This U.S. policy could destabilize the region — which has previously been a fairly steady oasis in the country — and trigger the final exit of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq as a whole.

The military aid is uncoordinated, unbalanced, unconditional, and unmonitored. Because of the lack of oversight on weapons’ allocation, and because the weapons come with no strings attached, officials can direct them to their own affiliated peshmerga forces, empowering loyalist officers and entangling the rest of the officer corps in petty rivalries. All this distracts the peshmerga from the real task at hand: assessing, preparing for, and countering terrorist threats. To fix the problem, the U.S.-led coalition should place any assistance under a single command, under civilian control and away from political rivalries.
[…]
The West has failed to consider both the evolution of the peshmerga and Kurdish politics in general. It has conditioned weapons deliveries to the KRG on the approval of Baghdad, a policy designed to keep the Iraqi capital sovereign and to discourage total Kurdish independence. But the policy is outdated. Today, the PUK is ascendant in Baghdad, so channeling weapons to the Iraqi government has only further alienated the KDP from the central government. In turn, KDP officials have made increasingly provocative calls for independence and solicited direct arming to cut out Baghdad, which it views as being dominated by Iran. Western policymakers might shrug, believing that such divisions will at least prevent the parties from successfully joining together to press for an independent Iraqi Kurdistan; in reality, these divisions prevent Kurdish parties from effectively participating in the Iraqi state.

 
This doesn’t automatically mean the United States and its allies should not be supplying weapons to Iraqi Kurdistan’s peshmerga forces, but it does signal that the policy should be reorganized.

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