Tag Archives: ISIS

Turkey’s Erdogan wants ground troops on ISIS, but not his own

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Recep Tayyip Erdogan, president of the country with the 6th largest active duty military force in the world and a border with both countries where ISIS is active, has a lot of nerve saying “ground troops” are necessary to fight ISIS but that “the coalition” (which doesn’t include Turkey at the moment) should provide them.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Tuesday the besieged Syrian city of Kobani was in imminent danger of falling to Islamic State and called on the U.S.-led coalition fighting the radical group to bolster its air raids with ground operations.

 
Way to outsource.

ISIS still the biggest threat to its own longevity

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iraq-map-ciaNo surprise here: Even with almost no official outreach to Iraq’s Sunni clan leaders happening, ISIS occupation is so miserable that those local Sunni leaders are voluntarily teaming up with Kurdish and Shia paramilitaries on an ad hoc basis to mobilize their personal regiments against the ISIS fighters.

Which is not to say they’re happy about it. One leader quoted in the New York Times report said, in reference to partnering with pro-government forces to fight ISIS, “We are ready to shake hands with the devil” — not exactly a ringing endorsement of Baghdad or Iraqi unity.

But the underlying reality still stands: The so-called “Islamic State” is far too vicious and inflexible (not to mention religiously questionable) to win the hearts and minds necessary to prevent uprisings against them, even within what should theoretically be their core constituency (disaffected Sunnis in western Iraq). If their administrative capacities are degraded by Assad or the coalition airstrikes in Syria, that will further crippling their ability to remain in place.

ISIS will be defeated, one way or another, because it’s unsustainable. It’s just a question of how much it will cost the local communities and the world — in lives and money — before that end is achieved.

ISIS enters Kobani, street combat begins

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Today (October 5), ISIS forces captured the southeastern hill overlooking Kobani and breached the town entrance below it (see maps below) as shells rained down inside the town. Fresh U.S. airstrikes the same day appeared to have almost no effect. Syrian Kurdish YPG/YPJ resistance fighters continue to fiercely defend every meter of land, as block-by-block fighting began on the southeast. On the other side of the town, ISIS siege forces continue to tighten the noose and are still pressing up the Aleppo Road to the southwest entrance. Here’s the report from CNN:

ISIS intensified its attack on the city of Kobani as militants took a strategic hill Sunday evening and entered the southeastern edge of the city, a fighter and a media activist inside the city tell CNN.

The sources, who both requested their names be withheld for security reasons, said street-to-street fighting has started in Kobani.
[…]
ISIS fighters overpowered Kurdish forces to take the top and the eastern side of Meshta Nour, the strategic hill overlooking Kobani, the sources said.

A civilian source inside Kobani said there have been heavy clashes on all fronts around Kobani and that ISIS forces had been moved back from a small corner of the city they’d held for two days.

The Kurdish People’s Protection Unit, or YPG, said in a statement that 86 “terrorists” were killed during a 24-hour period and 17 YPG members died.

On Sunday, smoke billowed over Kobani as ISIS sent bombs into the middle of town.

Kobani is now tightly surrounded in a crescent from the Aleppo road on the southwestern outskirts of the city all the way to the eastern edge of Kobani, near the Turkish border, the fighter and media activist said.

ISIS is making inroads despite airstrikes by U.S. and allied forces, including Sunday’s strikes on the eastern outskirts of the city.

The YPG destroyed an ISIS tank in the east of Kobani near Kane Kordan, a large mound on the eastern side of the city, the civilian source said.

ISIS fighters are now about about one kilometer south on the Aleppo road, the civilian source said.

 
Turkey’s parliament voted last week to authorize participation in the coalition efforts in Syria against ISIS, and more than two dozen tanks are still sitting on the other side of the border from Kobani, but no action has been taken yet. Turkish security forces clashed with increasingly enraged Kurdish protesters who are upset over Turkish inaction against the dozen of ISIS tanks and heavy artillery positions pounding away at the town within line of sight. On Saturday, commentator Juan Cole suggested that the Battle of Kobani might prove to be the “Kurdish Alamo.”

Labeled overhead map of Kobani / Ayn Al-Arab, Syria, October 5, 2014. Click map to enlarge or click here to navigate in Google Maps.

Labeled overhead map of Kobani / Ayn Al-Arab, Syria, October 5, 2014. Click map to enlarge or click here to navigate in Google Maps.

Labeled digital rendering, looking eastward, of Kobani / Ayn Al-Arab, Syria, October 5, 2014. ISIS captured the hill on the right, allowing it to shell the town center Click map to enlarge or click here to navigate in Google Maps.

Labeled digital rendering, looking eastward, of Kobani / Ayn Al-Arab, Syria, October 5, 2014. ISIS captured the hill on the right, allowing it to shell the town center. Click map to enlarge or click here to navigate in Google Maps.

Labeled digital rendering, looking northward, of Kobani / Ayn Al-Arab, Syria, October 5, 2014. ISIS captured the hill on the bottom, allowing it to shell the town center Click map to enlarge or click here to navigate in Google Maps.

Labeled digital rendering, looking northward, of Kobani / Ayn Al-Arab, Syria, October 5, 2014. ISIS captured the heights just southeast, allowing it to shell the town center. Click map to enlarge or click here to navigate in Google Maps.

24 violations of Islam by ISIS according to over 100 Sunni scholars

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To fight rampant Islamophobia, here are 16 pages of Sunni Islamic scholarship on religious violations committed by the so-called “Islamic State”, as assembled and exhaustively footnoted by 126 Sunni Muslim scholars of the religious texts and prominent Sunni Muslim religious and political leaders from at least 40 countries, in an open letter to the leader and followers of ISIS. Their hope is that it will not only serve as a public, internal Islamic rebuttal to the terrorist organization’s assertions of an Islamic State but also sway conservative Muslims who might sympathize with the group’s hardline approach.

Below is 24-point executive summary ahead of the full (and very readable) explications of each violation and news citations of the relevant abuses:

Executive Summary
1- It is forbidden in Islam to issue fatwas without all the necessary learning requirements. Even then fatwas must follow Islamic legal theory as defined in the Classical texts. It is also forbidden to cite a portion of a verse from the Qur’an — or part of a verse — to derive a ruling without looking at everything that the Qur’an and Hadith teach related to that matter. In other words, there are strict subjective and objective prerequisites for fatwas, and one cannot ‘cherry-pick’ Qur’anic verses for legal arguments without considering the entire Qur’an and Hadith.
2- It is forbidden in Islam to issue legal rulings about anything without mastery of the Arabic language.
3- It is forbidden in Islam to oversimplify Shari’ah matters and ignore established Islamic sciences.
4- It is permissible in Islam [for scholars] to differ on any matter, except those fundamentals of religion that all Muslims must know.
5- It is forbidden in Islam to ignore the reality of contemporary times when deriving legal rulings.
6- It is forbidden in Islam to kill the innocent.
7- It is forbidden in Islam to kill emissaries, ambassadors, and diplomats; hence it is forbidden to kill journalists and aid workers.
8- Jihad in Islam is defensive war. It is not permissible without the right cause, the right purpose and without the right rules of conduct.
9- It is forbidden in Islam to declare people non-Muslim unless he (or she) openly declares disbelief.
10- It is forbidden in Islam to harm or mistreat — in any way —Christians or any ‘People of the Scripture’.
11- It is obligatory to consider Yazidis as People of the Scripture.
12- The re-introduction of slavery is forbidden in Islam. It was abolished by universal consensus.
13- It is forbidden in Islam to force people to convert.
14- It is forbidden in Islam to deny women their rights.
15- It is forbidden in Islam to deny children their rights.
16- It is forbidden in Islam to enact legal punishments (hudud) without following the correct procedures that ensure justice and mercy.
17- It is forbidden in Islam to torture people.
18- It is forbidden in Islam to disfigure the dead.
19- It is forbidden in Islam to attribute evil acts to God.
20- It is forbidden in Islam to destroy the graves and shrines of Prophets and Companions.
21- Armed insurrection is forbidden in Islam for any reason other than clear disbelief by the ruler and not allowing people to pray.
22- It is forbidden in Islam to declare a caliphate without consensus from all Muslims.
23- Loyalty to one’s nation is permissible in Islam.
24- After the death of the Prophet, Islam does not require anyone to emigrate anywhere.

 
I learned a ton of new information from reading the whole letter, which can be just as easily applied against ISIS as against bigots who paint Islam with an overly broad brush (despite its natural complexity and disunity).

Thanks to a reader for bringing this document to my attention.

Oped | Reform Islam Vs. the Billionaire Barons

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My new oped in The Globalist argues that Islam isn’t inherently backward — as is mistakenly often suggested in Western media — it’s being held back by powerful donors who support extreme versions of it and make those the focus of attention. Here’s an excerpt, discussing lack of doctrinal uniformity in Islam versus the unifying force of money to extreme causes:

Sunni Islam alone has a handful of diverging schools of thought, further splintered by the separate followings of various popular current scholars.

Unfortunately the loudest and perhaps best-organized sub-segment of the sect recently seems to be the engine driving extremist groups all over the world. But even that analysis misdiagnoses and misattributes a centralization that is not really there, beyond a superficial level.

The emerging global networks of fundamentalist Sunni Islamic terrorism of the past 5, 15 and 25 years are linked in practice only because they have voluntarily associated with each other and with a specific brand of the religion.

The networks have co-opted or completely supplanted decades-old movements in places as diverse as Mali or Philippines, which had aimed to address local poverty and institutional inequalities (or obtain independence).

This voluntary association between groups, in countries from West Africa to Southeast Asia, has only been made possible by atypically centralized funding sources that provide seed money and setup advice for local franchises before they are able to become financially self-sustaining.

Most of the franchises have not been able to reach self-sufficiency and continue only by the grace of the startup funders. The rest generally continue to receive advice from the funding sources and remain associated with the other groups for brand value and the attention that comes with it.

These funders — not preachers — are the ones who really shape existing local grievances and separatist movements into a globalized, semi-unified ideology. Without them, the decentralization inherent to Islam would continue to reign.

The efforts to create a caliphate spanning the globe aren’t springing up from the grassroots of abandoned and impoverished desert populations. Rather it springs fully formed from the men bearing suitcases of cash and ideological directives on what must be done and said to keep it coming.

This money is coming from fundraisers in Qatar and Kuwait and donors in those countries, as well as in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and beyond. If those donor networks were broken and permanently dismantled, it would break apart the emerging coalition of co-associating local movements subscribing to a hardline, Islamic globalism.

 
If you click through, I also cite a specific example of a very progressive, high-ranking Muslim leader in Nigeria.

Iraq PM committed to rival countries bombing Iraq’s neighbors, just not Iraq

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The juxtaposition of the new Iraqi Prime Minister’s views, in a BBC interview, on which Arab countries should be bombing other Arab countries produces some pretty amazing (and unsurprising) geopolitical NIMBYism:

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has told the BBC he “totally” opposes Arab nations joining air strikes against Islamic State in his country.

vs.

Mr Abadi said he had sent a delegation to Damascus to inform its neighbour of Iraq’s request for the coalition to target IS in Syria, saying it was crucial to stop “transient border terrorism”.

 
Don’t bomb us without permission — bomb them without permission!

iraq-map-ciaNow, again, it’s not that surprising. I’m sure Prime Minister Abadi doesn’t really want a precedent established that he, the leader of his country, is so weak he must seek help from his neighbors and invite their interference. Moreover, it probably hurts him, as the political head of Iraq’s majority Shia faction, if he welcomes Iraq’s Sunni-ruled neighbors’ armed forces bombing Iraq, even if they’re targeting armed groups in Iraq, and even if those groups happen to be Sunni insurgents this time. (After all, bombing Sunni Iraqis is a job for the Shia-dominated Iraqi Air Force, with as much cruelty and incompetence as possible.)

In his defense: It’s just generally not a great idea to invite neighbors — especially ones with a tense and sometimes bitter history of rivalry (or even past territorial disputes) — to feel welcome to bomb you. In contrast, it’s probably (somewhat) less objectionable to request air support from halfway around the world. It’s one thing to publicly invite the strongest air power in the world to help you because your own air force is under-equipped and terrible and useless; it’s a very different matter to draw attention to the fact that the surrounding Arab states of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait (which hasn’t participated so far) all have vastly superior air forces to Iraq’s.

And, to top it off, the recent unilateral airstrikes in Libya by the United Arab Emirates, following up on their Arab League authorized operations in 2011, might also have made Abadi cautious about opening that door now and laying out the welcome mat for future meddling in Iraq, as in Libya.

But telling them to target insurgents in Syria seems to be another matter for Abadi — and one without a whole lot of additional logic, other than that it’s not Iraq, so it’s not his problem. It might also be that he needs to emphasize his “request” for coalition airstrikes in Syria to strengthen the case that the US-led coalition isn’t violating international law by intervening in Syria without permission because it is simply targeting a Syrian-based threat to the Iraqi state. (I’m a little skeptical of that reasoning, given that most people don’t consider it legal during the Vietnam War for the US to have bombed Vietnamese insurgent / North Vietnamese Army supply lines in Laos and Cambodia, even to defend the South Vietnamese government.)

At any rate, the more things change, the more things stay the same — and that includes Gulf-area countries trying to play each other off each other constantly to try to gain tiny edges momentarily.

ISIS still moving faster than coalition forces on Kobani; will Turkey enter?

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A second round of US-led coalition airstrikes hit ISIS positions around Kobani on Tuesday, but the group had tightened the circle around the town down to two miles (down from about five or so on Saturday, when the first airstrikes hit), according to CNN:

Rear Adm. John Kirby, spokesman for the Pentagon, said U.S. airstrikes overnight hit the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani.

A civilian inside Kobani, near the Turkish border, told CNN on Monday that ISIS was closing in.

The terror group is three kilometers (nearly two miles) east of the town, the civilian said on the condition of anonymity, basically confirming a report from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a London-based monitoring group.
[…]
When asked why strikes in the Kobani area may appear to be limited, a senior U.S. official said — speaking separately on background — that factors which may make it appear that way include that the United States has no direct reliable intelligence on the ground and that precise and careful targeting is needed to avoid civilian casualties.

 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Turkish border, Turkey’s government and military still seems to be weighing whether or not to become directly involved militarily in the civil war by crossing into Syrian territory — and perhaps weighing the long-term consequences of establishing and defending an autonomous Kurdish zone in northern Syria — but in any case they edged visibly closer toward intervention.

30 tanks and armored vehicles from a Turkish armored division have arrived at the border crossing with Syria within sight of where ISIS tanks and artillery have besieged Kobani. If the tanks cross the border, this would be the first time a foreign military’s ground forces have entered the fight against ISIS. The Turkish military reported that they fired on Syrian territory Sunday in response to ISIS shells landing on the Turkish side of the border, but so far no substantial action has occurred.

This may change if parliament approves an intervention, which is under discussion … or if ISIS forces directly attack Turkish troops — a scenario raised again this week by Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc in relation to the Turkish Special Forces stationed at the Tomb of Suleiman Shah in an enclave near Aleppo. The tomb, guarded by Turkey’s military since 1938 under the terms of a 1921 treaty with France, has been repeatedly and publicly identified by ISIS as a target all year. ISIS may have hesitated to attack the Turkish enclave, given that a direct assault might trigger an automatic invasion of Syria by all of NATO, under Article V. Turkey beefed up security at the tomb significantly earlier in the year (rather than withdrawing), but the troops there are reportedly tenuously supplied due to deteriorating local conditions as the Aleppo region becomes the center of fighting between Turkish-backed Syrian Arab rebels, the Syrian government, and ISIS.

In another development at Kobani, the Turkish government says they will allow Syrian Kurdish fighters to cross from Kobani into Turkey if forced to cede the field to ISIS, but only without their weapons. This continues the balancing act between humanitarian responsibilities as a refuge and their fear of a disintegration of the ceasefire and peace talks with the Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey itself. The Syrian Kurdish fighters are viewed as a potentially destabilizing factor in the effort to make peace within Turkey.
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