Arsenal For Democracy

More Than A Hairstyle: The Resurgence of Natural Hair

By De Ana Jones April 2, 2015 - 4:00 pm April 2, 2015 Arsenal Essay

It’s hard for some to believe that something so simple as hair could be so political. It’s something we all have, and seems to be a topic more fit for fashion magazines than serious debate. However for Black people, the subject of hair can be a very sore topic. From tignons to hot combs to chemical straighteners, Black women have been at best enthusiastically “encouraged” and at worst lawfully obligated to alter or even hide their hair to be considered acceptable in society.

Recently, with the rise of YouTube videos and loads of resources on the internet, many Black women have decided to ditch the straighteners and go back to natural hairstyles. ‘Locs have made a comeback in a big way, but more Black women are increasingly enjoying their unbound hair, in the form of twist-outs, braid-outs, wash-and-go’s, and many other different styles. You can find tutorials on YouTube for specific styles, natural hair care blogs for maintenance, and ever ask for advice on Twitter about dying or temporarily straightening your ‘fro without doing the extensive damage that would happen before.

More and more Black celebrities are also showing off their natural hair to the world. Artists like Janelle Monae and Solange are known for their long coils and have no shame wearing them out in public for all to see.

Solange Knowles proudly sporting natural hair at the Cannes Film Festival in 2013. (Credit: Georges Biard / Wikimedia)

Although more Black women are embracing their natural hair, there’s still a stigma about whether or not it is considered presentable or professional. In 2012, after responding to a racist comment about her wearing her natural hair on television, Rhonda Lee was fired from her job as a TV anchor. In 2013, a girl in Florida was told that she would have to cut her afro or be suspended from school. Last year, U.S. Army regulations that seemed to discriminate against natural Black hair types for female troops also earned a scathing Daily Show segment by Jessica Williams, before they were revised.

Most recently, the French magazine Public referred to Solange Knowles’s afro as “coiffée comme un dessous de bras” which translates into English as “hair done like armpit hair.” The article went viral on Twitter, and user @huegolden started the hashtag #TwitpicYourCheveuxCrepus encouraging people to post pictures of their natural hairstyles. Both English- and French-speaking Twitter users shared pictures of their hair, sending the message to the public that Black hair types are just as beautiful as any other hair type.

But it isn’t just Black hair styles that is the problem; the actual problem seems to be the bodies that the hairstyles are attached to. Earlier this year two starlets wore temporary “faux ‘loc” styles and got two very different responses to them. Kylie Jenner, one of the younger sisters of the Kardashian clan, revealed her temporary ‘locs on her Instagram page and was immediately lauded as a trendsetter for her “edgy” new look. A few weeks later at the Academy Awards, Zendaya, a young Black actress, was mocked for her decision to wear faux ‘locs to the show.

The idea that Black hair is unprofessional, unpresentable, or even dirty stems from racist stereotypes and a complete lack of understanding about Black hair. While you can go almost anywhere and find a salon that works with straight hair, salons that work with Black hair textures are almost impossible to find outside of Black neighborhoods, and salons that work with natural hair and not just straightened Black hair are even more niche. It’s that level of isolation that leaves most White people clueless about and prejudiced against the many different kinks and coils that make up Black hair.

It seems, though, that the tide is turning in favor of natural hair, as more and more women elect to wear their curls out, and more and more companies are coming out with products for non-chemically straightened Black hair.

The Singapore Model probably isn’t widely applicable

By Bill Humphrey April 1, 2015 - 9:00 am April 1, 2015 Arsenal Analysis

In tributes to Singapore’s recently passed founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, much was made of the (undeniable) gains in prosperity and standards of living among the people under his strictly “managed” pseudo-democracy, as well as of how happy most residents are with their quality of life and the safety and cleanliness of their little country.

The late Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, 1959-1990; cabinet member, 1990-2012. (U.S. Government photo, 2002)

The logical extension of these commentaries has been to ask whether the success of this (almost literally) shining city on a busy coast means democracy isn’t the best way to produce a “government for the people” that actually governs well. Despite the name of this site, I’m open-minded enough to at least consider the possibility that there are other forms of government that might be equally (or even better) suited to a given society’s governance. I don’t presume to assert with certainty that Western liberal democracy is positively the be-all/end-all or the universally applicable ideal. But let’s not get too carried away by Lee Kuan Yew and the Singapore story and draw overly broad conclusions in the opposite direction either.

For a start, some of the quality of life and law enforcement issues are actually more controversial than the glowing tributes from around the world would imply; things are pretty rigid and harsh sometimes. Even the reported happiness, according to Singaporean commentator Sun Xi in a November 2013 article in The Globalist, is debatable…

But for the sake of argument, let’s stipulate that his governance of Singapore was predominantly very good and served the public interest well, despite the lack of free, fair, and open elections. Let’s say that model worked effectively in Singapore. Would that really be enough to argue credibly that Lee Kuan Yew’s legacy might undermine liberal representative democracy’s claims to serving the public interest most effectively (and therefore governing on behalf of the people best)?

I would suggest not. There’s a major component missing in such analyses. It is probably far easier to have an effective and responsive yet non-democratic government if there is also broad/near-universal agreement in that specific society about the goals and purposes of government. Democracy is less “necessary,” so to speak, for effective governance in the public interest if everyone in a society more or less agrees on what their government should be doing and what an ideal society would look like. If everyone agrees, the government just has to do those things well, and it will have succeeded. That agreement is likelier to be found in a small place like Singapore. In a vaster and more politically or culturally heterogeneous society, such as the United States, democracy is necessary to provide a stable and peaceful mechanism for sorting out competing fundamental visions of governance.
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April 1, 2015 – Arsenal For Democracy 122

By Bill Humphrey April 1, 2015 - 8:00 am April 1, 2015 Radio Show

Topics: Big Ideas for Reforming American Governance: Does the US have too many elected offices? Should legislators be trustees for or delegates from their voters? People: Bill, Nate, Sasha. Produced: March 30th, 2015.

Note for listeners: We’re testing a half-hour version of the show over the next few weeks. Let us know whether you prefer this format or the longer format.

Episode 122 (28 min):
AFD 121

Discussion points:

– Do we have too many elected offices in the United States? Should most elections occur at the same time (e.g. on the presidential ballot) or be spread out?
– Which offices should be elected and which appointed? When should policies be created by elected officials versus subject experts?
– Are elections too complicated to produce clear mandates for various offices and identify the will of the people on specific issues?
– Is the role of an elected official to be a trustee acting independently in the best interest of the people regardless of their views, or is it to be a delegate with a mandate to fulfill the people’s wishes?

A theory of legitimate, ideal transitional government

By Bill Humphrey March 31, 2015 - 3:04 am April 11, 2015 Arsenal Essay, Arsenal Research

There are always many questions in how best to transition a non-democratic country to democracy — particularly because these transitions often occur during periods of unrest and instability, if not outright war or revolution.

Moreover, the outgoing regime has usually worked hard to stamp out formal opposition leadership/membership as well as any likely interim replacements and lower levels of legitimate authority that could present an alternative to the regime’s continued existence. And rarely is there any workable means of conducting free and fair elections without first overhauling the entire system.

This creates a chicken-and-egg paradox: Which comes first — the new system to find leaders or the new leaders to create a system?

voting

Key questions

So, with most popularly legitimate authorities destroyed by the outgoing regime and no way to immediately replace it, what is the next best alternative in an ideal situation? Here are some guiding philosophical questions that suggest preferable alternatives:

In a transition to representative democracy from a non-democracy without a functioning voter system for immediate transitional elections, should interim power derive from the lowest available popular representatives? This seems likely to provide it with the most broad-based support from the public and authorities alike.
Or should interim power rest with a self-identified cadre of internal regime reformers and external academics/technocrats? Or a cadre identified by a supranational political organization (such as the United Nations, African Union, or Arab League)? Can a truly legitimate constitution and electoral system be developed by a representative cross-section cadre of non-elected transitional leaders? To all these, I suspect the answer is no because it risks limiting public cooperation.
Or should interim power devolve immediately to the local level to organize and oversee ad hoc transitional elections for a constitutional assembly to the best of their ability? Even in a non-democratic system without much of a civil society, there is nearly always some subsidiary local level of governance where popular will is not totally repressed and unrepresented. Absolute power eventually runs out of steam somewhere close to the bottom of the government structure in a country of any substantial size, thus leaving some level of officials relatively untainted. Can that level of government legitimately select useful transitional leaders? I believe so.
How can transitional leaders be made impartial and secured against the corruption of power? How do we ensure they will leave at the end of their transitional mandate? Strict checks, short timetables, and separation of transitional roles should resolve these issues.
During a transition, is it preferable to hew closely to the existing constitutional order and reform it through its formal mechanism, despite its corruption — or is it better to abandon it in favor of a creative vacuum that can rebuild the system from scratch? There are advantages and disadvantages to either course. To leave it entirely courts chaos, but to keep it risks failed or stunted transition (tearing down the master’s house with the master’s tools).

Goals

I have endeavored below to develop an idealized system that addresses as many of these concerns as possible while offering a regulated roadmap with clear guidelines for conducting a responsible and true transition in as many different countries as possible.

Desired qualities of the transition guide proposal, therefore, include: broad applicability, maximal interim stability, brevity of and limitations upon extraordinary conditions, thoroughness of overhaul, manageable democratic characteristics, and prevention of backsliding.

This roadmap discards the existing system and constitution at the national level but uses its local organs to form temporary replacements for the national government and select drafters of a new, permanent order. That initial approach returns governing and drafting legitimacy as close to the people as possible in an orderly fashion but without the need for infeasible, immediate nationwide elections.

Proposed transitional order to maximize stability, reforms, and interim legitimacy:

Go to the lowest, most local body of government that is free of regime appointees and have that body (in every part of the country, collectively) nominate two separate assemblies with different mandates. (N.B. This step may require alteration if a single-party state exists and all members of the local bodies nationwide are from the same party.)
Each of the two transitional assemblies has 1 representative per smallest local district level inclusive of the whole country (e.g. county, canton, department). The first assembly is just constitutional drafters. The second assembly is tasked only with naming and monitoring a caretaker cabinet and its leader, with no role in drafting.
The caretaker cabinet is given a 3 month term, and its members are drawn from outside both assemblies to insulate drafting & governing roles. The cabinet leader — e.g. an interim Prime Minister — cannot be re-nominated to the cabinet at the end of a 3-month caretaker cabinet term.
For transitional executive simplicity, the cabinet rules by decree (voted through by cabinet majority), but the nominating assembly holds veto power by 2/3rds vote to deter grievous abuses of power. Decrees hold effect until the expiration of 6 months and cannot effect elections or the drafting of the constitution. Even during the 6 months they hold effect, all decrees are not binding on next caretaker cabinet or permanent government elected later, but they can be renewed if desired.
The constitutional assembly drafts the constitution on a 9-month non-extendable timeline. It also establishes first election procedures for a permanent legislature (or any other elective national offices under the new constitution) and supervises the first election. Both transitional assemblies go out of existence as soon as the permanent government and legislators are sworn in.
The country’s security forces are tasked only with maintaining order, borders, and election safety during the transition. No official role is permitted in the political transition, both in the cabinet and the drafting process. Security forces answer to the civilian caretaker cabinet.
Constitutional drafters and the final interim cabinet leader are automatically barred from all offices for 1 cycle under the new, permanent system. The other assembly’s members and other cabinet officials are not barred from running and serving in any elective or appointed offices under the new constitution.

Optional additional points:

A yes-no referendum could be held on ratification of the constitution prior to the first election of permanent officials. However, this risks exposing the new constitution to significant challenges to its authority and supremacy even if successfully ratified. It also risks no constitution being adopted within a concise timeframe.
A temporarily higher threshold for amending the constitution could exist for the first two cycles to promote stabilization of the new order, encourage inter-party cooperation, and provide a cooling off period on proposed early major changes.

In UK, everything now rests on the final campaign

By Bill Humphrey March 30, 2015 - 9:00 am March 30, 2015 Arsenal Pulse

The campaign for the May 2015 general elections is officially under way now in the United Kingdom. And barring a huge swing between now and the election, the results are going to be chaos.

Below are the March 30th projections from The Guardian’s election center (updated daily at the link)

https://twitter.com/GdnPolitics/status/582452523950321664

Labour are campaigning hard against the SNP (to try to regain marginally SNP-leaning constituencies in Scotland), but that will make it harder to work together after the election. Which is an important consideration, seeing as they’re basically the only two parties that will collectively have anywhere near a majority.

And the Lib Dems seem pretty averse to working with Labour and the SNP, but they can’t easily go back to the Conservatives either.

The Conservatives may well finish first but (under current polling) have basically no shot of leading a government anyway, even with UKIP and the Lib Dems and the DUP. I mean…unless they’re planning to go into coalition with Labour or the SNP, which is beyond unlikely.

So that means…a big swing in favor of either Labour or the Conservatives is probably the only thing now that can prevent a totally bananas outcome or an irredeemably hung parliament.

The Benghazi “scandal” witchhunt made the world less stable

By Bill Humphrey March 30, 2015 - 8:00 am September 22, 2016 Arsenal Pulse

In a piece yesterday in The Globalist, David Apgar argues that the Republican obsession with drumming up a scandal over Benghazi has forced the United States to disengage further with the world at a dangerous crossroads in history.

Partly as a result of the hearings, the United States has withdrawn its last 100 military personnel from Yemen, a special-forces group that has been productive in disrupting terror plots if not in stabilizing the poorest country in the region.
[…]
What explains the withdrawal is the veiled threat that Congress will hobble the State and Defense Departments with investigations as arbitrary, burdensome and costly as the Benghazi hearings every time someone sets fire to a U.S. base or captured U.S. personnel appear in garish jump suits kneeling on video in front of knife-wielding psychopaths.
[…]
Neither the Obama Administration nor future U.S. governments can afford the distraction promised for adverse outcomes of useful risks — risks like contributing to the MNF in 1983 and maintaining a presence in Benghazi, the heart of a nascent Libyan polity, in 2012.

Our retreat from Libya very likely reduced our (already very restricted) ability to keep a lid on the tense national situation and to be aware of rapidly developing situations on the ground. The transition fell apart into chaos. Likewise, while I don’t support most of what the United States has been doing in Yemen for years now, I think it was probably preferable that we maintain a physical and diplomatic presence as long as possible during its sputtering transition.

Every president has been skittish about embassy attacks since the Iranian hostage crisis lasted over a year and helped undermine Jimmy Carter politically as he headed into his unsuccessful re-election bid. But that was a pretty huge crises in its own right, without anyone manufacturing one beyond that. In this case, an already tragic event — the death of four Americans including a veteran diplomat — became such a political battleground, despite the facts and despite the lack of a coverup, that the Obama Administration had to be wary of any elevation of risk at any embassy anywhere in the entire Middle East North Africa region.

And so it is that the people accusing Democrats of “running scared” in the world and not “leading” — or whatever nonsense they’re blowing hard about due to their lack of nuanced understanding of world affairs — are the very same people raising the political risk of doing anything in the world so high that retreat is the only option.

Drawbacks of Technocracy, Part 2: Blue-ribbon America

By Bill Humphrey March 29, 2015 - 6:28 pm March 30, 2015 Arsenal Essay

In part 1, “Europe’s Political Crisis,” I examined the (well-intended) rise of governance and policy decision-making by unelected technical experts in the European Union, along with the effects it has had on promoting a growing political crisis there. I also suggested that a milder version of this trend is starting to make its way into the U.S. political system as well — or at least into the U.S. political philosophy that influences the system.

As I argued in [another] recent piece, in the United States, “there is now a prevailing assumption that everything can be converted into numerical values, and that we can forge our country into a Blue-ribbon technocracy of ‘best practices’ with no subjective judgment calls (or perhaps eventually even directional disagreements altogether).”

The conditions for technocracy’s growth

The circumstances that have encouraged the beginnings of technocracy to emerge in the United States are not exactly the same as the circumstances in Europe. Here, it is philosophically grounded in the now largely faded early American notions of a republican government of wise and elite elders who do what is best for the people, with or without their consent. The role of experts in the United States has so far been limited to advisory roles with far less formal and front-row power than in Europe. Very rarely have they gained official, high-ranking decision-making roles in place of politicians.

In Europe, in contrast, a major factor in the rise of powerful technocrats was the creation of the European Union as an economic union that required — but did not officially hold — significant political power to be able to implement its economic integration policies. That gap between needs in practice and anticipated needs on paper created a decision-making vacuum that the experts filled. No politicians were being replaced directly because there were no powerful federal politicians in the EU or predecessor European Economic Community to begin with. (In the United States, obviously, there has been a strong political union of the member states with its own strong and elected federal government since the Constitution of 1787.) The creation of that pseudo-federal “European” layer of unelected experts making decisions then established a precedent for deferring to national level experts when the national political systems began breaking down more recently in the face of very serious policy and budgetary demands from the Union and elections failed to produce the necessary leadership to enact them. Such crises create the conditions for the constitutional but non-democratic elevation of unelected experts to the cabinet and, in Italy’s case, even the premiership.

The stalemate in elected governance, though, does bear similarity to much of what we have seen in the United States lately. With polarization and dysfunction mounting, rather than making smaller procedural fixes like overhauling the Senate rules, there is likely to be a growing chorus of people seriously suggesting drastic alternatives for achieving policy aims. In past gridlock/crises points, radical reformation of the American constitutional system has been suggested. This time, following the European model, it is more likely that the proposed alternatives would be the gentler introduction of expert commissions empowered to present big decisions for rubber-stamping to the legislative branch or executive bureaucracy.

This solution is particularly likely to be applied, as in Europe, to budgetary reform gridlock, because a certain set of people is already convinced that such reforms are desperately needed and cannot be entrusted with making the “hard choices.” (Interestingly, we don’t see such a push on global warming.)

Redistricting

The gold standard example of American technocracy so far is the trend toward elimination in many states of legislature-driven redistricting in favor of unelected “nonpartisan” commissions. Nine states have abdicated redistricting entirely to outside commissions. A further 13 have some kind of commission in parallel with or assisting the legislators in the redistricting — including five where the commission serves as a “backup” when the normal process fails and a few where a commission is empowered to draw the state districts but not the congressional districts.
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